Abstract

Sudan has never experienced peace since it attained its independence from Britain in 1956. Most of the causes of the conflicts in Sudan are related to political domination, economic deprivation, and Islamization. The regime of former President Omar al Bashir since it took power from 1989-2019, it adopted a counter-insurgency strategy of using militias in the peripheral areas to confront alongside its army on the rebellious activities. The review literature on pro-government militias in the context of the unstable Sudan provides debates pertains violent atrocities committed by militias against innocent civilians in the name of counterinsurgency. The 2003 crisis in Darfur region clearly outlines the state strategy of employing the Janjaweed militia who later metamorphosed into Rapid Support Force, a paramilitary group who committed genocide and crime against humanity in the name of fighting the two rebel groups: the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). The RSF has grown a powerful paramilitary force that are now battling the State Army for the takeover of the government militarily. The militia group which was once built up by the state now turning a real danger to the transitional democracy. This paper argues that the RSF are the direct beneficiary of the state and are closely linked to its structures, its people, its wealth, and foreign partners. This paper draws a conclusion that amicable solution ought to be sought for the benefit of the marginalized peripheral areas of Darfur, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile or Sudan with this unstoppable conflict risks to fragment into different autonomous states.

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