Abstract
ABSTRACT After Russia’s massive Cyber-attacks on Ukraine’s government and bank sectors in January–February 2022, many analysts alleged that Cyber-power would be a crucial component of Russia’s military victory in Ukraine. Contrary to these expectations, however, Russian Cyber-intrusions yielded meagre strategic benefits, with Moscow seemingly prioritising conventional warfare and destruction of energy and civilian infrastructure instead. Using a theory of asymmetric conflict, this paper argues, somewhat counterintuitively, that the reason behind inhibited efficacy of Russian Cyber-operations post-2022 are Moscow’s prior Cyber-attacks against Ukraine since 2013. While having helped the Kremlin weaken Ukraine’s Cyber-networks and collect local intelligence, these antecedent Cyber-operations have provided a two-pronged learning loop: for Ukraine to cultivate habits of mitigating Russian Cyber-threats, and for Russia to acquire habits of relying on information operations more than on destructive Cyber-attacks. This “pedagogical” mechanism ultimately enabled Ukraine to redress its Cyber-asymmetry with Russia and deny Moscow success in its Cyber-intrusions post-2022.
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