The Path Towards an ‘Anti-British’ Strategy by the Japanese Navy between the Wars

Abstract

On 13 December 1921, as the first result of the Washington Conference, the Four-Power Treaty was signed between Japan, Britain, the United States and France, thereby bringing to an end the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which had lasted since 1902. Neither the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) nor the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN), responsible for Japan’s national defence, raised strong objections to this loss of an ally. This may be taken as evidence of the reduced military significance of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance since the end of its important mission in the Russo-Japanese War. At the time of the outbreak of the First World War, this alliance was undoubtedly the basis for Japan’s entry into the war. However, the Japanese entry into the war and the wartime co-operation between Japan and Britain as allies was characterized as much by mutual suspicions as by mutual co-operation. Therefore, it was natural that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was replaced at the Washington Conference by the Four-Power Treaty, which called for a loose co-operative relationship among its parties, and which included a United States that was strongly opposed to the continuation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The Washington Conference thus defined new Anglo-Japanese and Anglo-Japanese-American relationships in East Asia for the post-First World War period.