The Drafting of the Four-Power Treaty of the Washington Conference

Abstract

A CONSISTENT aim of American diplomacy in < the years following the first World War was the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. This objective was accomplished at the Washington Conference in December 1921, when the United States, Great Britain, Japan, and France signed the Four-Power Treaty and the parties involved renounced the AngloJapanese Alliance. This action opened a new phase in American foreign policy, for this treaty, along with the Nine-Power Pact of the WVashington Conference, gave practical assistance and the sanction of international law to the Open Door policy. Had this agreement been more positive the course of events in the Far East might well have been altered. If there was more shadow than substance in the Four-Power Treaty it may in part be explained by the conditions surrounding its conception. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, the masterarchitect of this plan, faced almost insurmountable obstacles in bringing it to completion. The United States was not a party to the AngloJapanese Alliance and as a consequence could not directly call for its abrogation. Furthermore, one of the parties to the alliance, Japan, was not at all convinced that abrogation was desirable.' The British were willing to co-operate with America but desired to replace the old alliance by including the United States in a new three-power alliance.2 The American public and the United States senate were adamant in their opposition to the Anglo-Japanese Al-