The Party And The Gun: Civil-military Relations

Abstract

Party-army relations in China under Mao Zedong were highly symbiotic for lack of clear institutional boundaries. This is due to Mao’s emphasis on “politics taking command” and “human factors”, but not divisionof-labour-based technical expertise. As a result, political alliances and conflicts were largely defined by personalised factions that cut across party-army boundaries. Under Deng Xiaoping, however, clearer party-army boundaries emerged because Deng had allowed for more institutional autonomy, so that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) could stay away from politics and pursue technical upgrading. The only caveat is that at the top leadership level such as the Central Military Commission (CMC), Deng relied on his personal influence and his pre-1949 Second Field Army comrades to control the army. These enabled him to employ the military against political opponents in the party and from society at critical moments such as the popular rebellion in 1989. By similar logic, many observers assumed that after he became the CMC chair in 1989, Jiang Zemin consolidated his power in the military through personnel appointments and budget increases, so that he was able to employ the military against his political opponents in the party and from society. During the 15 years of Jiang’s command of the gun, however, little evidence existed to show that Jiang had mobilised the military against political opponents in the party and from the society. Lacking Deng’s credentials and unsure of his ability to control a politically mobilised army, Jiang apparently adopted a different policy. That is, to enhance civilian governance, or the party’s legitimacy to rule by promoting