Conclusion: Explaining China's Use of Force

Abstract

CONTEMPORARY perceptions of a belligerent China and a bellicose People's Liberation Army (PLA) are heavily influenced by enduring myths about the country's strategic tradition and the relationship between the PLA and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In one myth, the perception of a defensive-minded, pacifist ancient culture – symbolized by the Great Wall – clashes with the new image of a more belligerent 1990s China. In the other myth, the assumption of a military completely subordinate to, or totally in synchronization with, a civilian elite in the People's Republic of China (PRC) – symbolized by the Long March – collides with the appearance of outspoken and independent-minded soldiers, claiming to speak for the Chinese nation. In fact, China's strategic culture is neither purely pacific nor belligerent. As Chapter 2 suggests, for hundreds of years there have been two strands, a Realpolitik one and a Confucian one. These strands interact to produce an enduring Chinese “Cult of Defense” that profoundly affects China's elites. Moreover, the careful analysis of Chinese communist civil-military culture in Chapter 3 demonstrates that it has long been possible to differentiate between civilian and military leaders. Even in the earliest days of the PRC, when the politico-military leadership dominated by Mao Zedong could be described as dual role, it was possible to make certain distinctions. Then in the late twentieth century, as civil-military culture was recast under Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, the PLA became far more separate and autonomous of the CCP, revealing in the process the potency of military culture.