Abstract
Could there be truths which are, in principle, inaccessible to us? Anyone but an extreme metaphysical realist will answer 'No'. For the items to which truth can be ascribed are not in rerum natura. They are the products of human thought-linguistic items, or what is conveyed by linguistic items, or beliefs. They involve the application of concepts, which requires that there be criteria for their application, and beings who can apply them. There is room for disagreement about how far we can render intelligible the idea of a truth which could only be discovered by beings with greater powers than our own. I need not consider such disagreement here. My topic is an argument against almost any interpretation of a negative answer to my opening question, including the weakest: the claim that, if 'p' is true, then there is no logical absurdity in the idea that some being at some time should know, or reasonably hold a tentative belief, or have evidence that p. Consider, then, the principle
Published Version
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