The overloaded state

Abstract

The conditions that produced Israel's strong state and the implications of that state are not likely to be replicated elsewhere, exactly. However, Israel's case offers some general lessons that ought to be considered by advocates of a strong bureaucratic state, as suggested by the New Public Administration of the 1968 Min-nowbrook Conference. These include: poor management of public enterprises and social services; high inflation; politicization of public sector employment; a plethora of centrally defined rules, many of which are evaded in the interests of flexible administration; lack of moderation in policy demands; and perpetuation of the state's dominance of the economy as it becomes the first resort of groups in distress. This essay explores conditions in Israel for a movement in the academic profession of public administration whose roots and principal focus have been in the United States. The self-proclaimed New Public Administration in the United States began with the Minnowbrook Conference in New York in September 1968. The mood of many conferees was antagonistic to the political establishment that seemed more intent on pursuing an unpopular war and maintaining law and order than in responding to demands for domestic social services. Several papers and much of the discussion stressed the need for public administrators to take upon themselves the articulation of, and response to, demands that had not found effective representation among the elective legislators and chief executive.(1) Here the concern is with those aspects of the Minnowbrook perspective that imply both more responsibility and more power for government bureaucrats. Israel has what may be the most powerful bureaucracy in all of the democracies. Israel's special history and circumstances make its details unlikely to be replicated elsewhere. Nonetheless, it suggests lessons for those who would strengthen the bureaucracies of other countries. There are positive and negative features of a powerful state. In a society that is relatively homogeneous, feels beselt by outsiders, and whose cultural and religious values shape the character of public policy, as in the Israeli case, the balance of a powerful state may be positive. Even in such a case, however, there are negative features of the strong state. Those who do not feel themselves in tune with the majority of the moment may pay a great price in the sacrifice of what they feel are their legitimate rights. In a heterogeneous country that is divided by a great plurality of world views, and where a individualistic, free-market tradition is prominent, as in the American case, the consequences of a powerful state may be severe.(2) There may be no lessons in the Israeli case that are simple and direct. Yet the weight of the more general warnings may justify this exercise.