Abstract

This article traces what hindsight shows to be the failure paths of the Ottoman ruling elites in dealing with the Greek revolution of 1821–1832. It considers why Sultan Mahmud II and the Ottoman ministers were unable to quell the ‘insurgence’ definitively and fend off Great Power intervention diplomatically. To this end, it looks into the reaction of the Ottoman rulers to the adversity as well as rivalries among the pashas of the sultan, which strained the imperial front, heightened violence against the insurgents, and then tore apart the military campaign. At the same time, it seeks to re-instate in the historiography of the Eastern Question the much-neglected Ottoman positionality with a contrapuntal approach. It places the agency of European and Ottoman actors within the same analytical frame in its discussion of the Great Power intervention in 1827, disclosing why the Ottoman ministers rejected the European Powers’ proposals to mediate between the imperial authorities and the Greek revolutionaries. Consulting fresh archival and secondary sources in the Arabic, English, French, Russian, Ottoman, and modern Turkish languages, the article draws attention to several overlooked yet vital moments of the revolution's storyline.

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