The Origins of the Historical Society: A Personal View

Abstract

June 2003 · Historically Speaking47 1980 and 1992 El Salvador, with U.S. aid provided under the Reagan Doctrine, defeated the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN). In all these instances the U.S. strategy called for carrots and sticks—aggressive militaryoperations againstthe rebels combined with liberalizing reforms to win over the uncommitted populace. And in all these cases the U.S. and its allies were successful. The glaring exception is Vietnam, where the U.S. pursued a similar strategy with a notable lack of success. America's failure was due to manyfactors, includingaham-handed military campaign that ignored successful counterinsurgencytechniquesofthepast But theultimate problemwas thatthe communist forcesoperatingin SouthVietnamhad a"deep rear" in North Vietnam, the Soviet Union, and China. The U.S. was loath to take decisive military action against any ofthese states for fear ofwidening the war. As a result, the insurgents alwayshad asafebase ofoperations across theborderandsteadysupplylines along the Ho ChiMinh trail. Even so, theVietcong didnotwin thewar. Theymerelysoftenedup the enemy for the conventional invasion that North Vietnam mounted in 1975. The question today is: does Iraq more closely resemble Vietnam or, on the other hand, thenumerous placeswhere U.S. counterinsurgency strategies prevailed? The answer is the latter. In the first place, Vietnam 's topography—lots ofjungles and mountains —was much more favorable to guerrilla operations thanthe deserts andtowns ofIraq. And, unlike in Vietnam, it is doubtful that any neighboring country will want to give long-termsupportto a Baathistguerrilla campaign againstcoalition forces. While neither Syria norIran,whichshare longborderswith Iraq, is friendlyto the U.S., theydo nothave particularlywarm feelings for Saddam Hussein either. In any case, neither state enjoys superpower patronage, so they would be at the mercy ofU.S. forces ifthey fomented a wave ofterrorist attacks against the occupation authorities. But simply because a guerrilla campaign against the U.S. is unlikely to succeed does not mean the occupation itselfwill be a success . Thatwill require a concerted campaign of"nation building" similar to those the U.S. has previouslyundertakenin countries ranging from Germany to Haiti. The lesson of those campaigns is clear: where U.S. troops stay the course for the long term (Germany, Italy,Japan, Philippines, Bosnia, Kosovo) they can change life for the better. Where they pull out too quickly (Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Somalia) things can go to hell in a handbasket pretty quickly. That's apointworthrememberingas PresidentBush vows to draw down U.S. forces in Iraq. Only ifthe U.S. militaryisprepared fora long, long stay will the Bush administration have any hope ofcarryingoutitsvowto turnIraqinto a nascent democracy. Max Boot is Olrn SeniorFellow at the Council onForeignRelationsandauthorqfThe SavageWars ofPeace: SmallWars and the Rise ofAmerican Power (BasicBooks, 2002). The Origins of the Historical Society: A Personal View Marc Trachtenberg What exactlyhappened in the American historical profession in the late 20th century? I can talk at length abouthowthings changed duringthe period I've been in the profession—thatis, the years since I started graduate school in 1966. 1 can talkaboutthe sources ofmyown discontent. I can talk about the things that led me personallyto playa certain role in the establishmentofthe Historical Societyfiveyears ago. I can, andwill, talkaboutall these things, but I still don'treallyunderstand whathappened. But I do know how those developments affected me personally. I'm a diplomatichistorian. The termitself is terriblyold-fashioned and, certainlybythe 1980s ifnot earlier, the whole field ofdiplomatic history had come to be viewed as old hat. That field, I think it's fair to say, was pushed to the margins ofthe profession. For that reason, diplomatic historians like me came to be particularly sensitive to whatwas going on within the profession. I certainly became quite disaffected. Whatwas so disturbingaboutwhatIsaw goingon around me? Two things really. First, I could not believe some ofthe things people were studying. I could not believe what was oftenheldup as "cuttingedge" historical work. (I wondered when I heard thatphrase: cutting through what? And was "cutting edge" simply a euphemism for "trendy"?) In any event, those topics struck me, increasingly , as absolutelytrivial. Itwas hard to imagine that people—indeed, apparently the majority of the profession—could actually viewthe kind ofworkthatwas beingheld up in thatwayas important. But the factis thatit was considered important, and thatjudgment 48Historically Speaking · June 2003 went hand in...