Abstract

The office of prime minister is one of the three or four basic institutions of British government; yet it has little significance in the formal constitution. This not unfamiliar paradox arises from the nature of the constitution. But the constitution may reasonably be redefined to go beyond the written-down and to include the accepted customs, practices and morality of government. It is then possible to set down the constitutional outlines of what would be generally understood as the office of prime minister. It would be on the following lines: 1. The Prime Minister is appointed by the Crown as being the leader of the majority in the House of Commons, and may retain the office and powers of prime minister while he or she has the support of a majority in the House. 2. The Prime Minister appoints (by the process of recommending to the Crown) Secretaries of State and other ministers who shall be responsible to him or her (but formally to Parliament) for the administration of the Departments of State. 3. The Prime Minister shall select from among his or her senior colleagues a Cabinet which shall be answerable to him or her, but formally responsible to Parliament, for governing. 4. The Cabinet is a collectivity chaired by the Prime Minister and guided by him or her in the conduct of its affairs. 5. The Prime Minister shall be First Lord of the Treasury, and head of the Civil Service and of the armed forces. 6. The powers of the Prime Minister in appointment and dismissal are unlimited except in the case of judges. 7. The Prime Minister is entitled to the support of all ministers for the whole programme of government in face of Parliament and the public, unless there is special exemption from the convention of collective responsibility. The Prime Minister does not expect dissenting ministers to resign, except at his or her request, but is entitled to be angry when they ‘leak’ their disagreements. 8. The Prime Minister is normally entitled to the dissolution of Parliament on request. Hence, defeat of the Government in the House of Commons on a specified vote of confidence does not lead to the resignation of the Prime Minister until after defeat in a general election. 9. A prime minister who retains a majority in the House of Commons chooses the date of a general election within the limit of five years.

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