The neglected moral benefits of the market

Abstract

Jerry Z. Muller I~ our society, defenses of the market come primarily rom those concerned with economic and material well-being. Those who see themselves as the protectors of morality are more likely to be antipathetic to the market. But what about the positive moral effects of the market that tend to get o v e r l o o k e d in na r rowly economistic discussions about production and distribution? To be sure, many of these benefits also have potential costs. But since these costs tend to receive the most attention from moralists, I will note them here without dilating upon them, not because they are less significant but because they are likely to be more familiar. One perennial pitfall in thinking about the moral effects of capitalism is the issue of comparison. When philosophers ask about the morality of capitalism, they too rarely ask "compared to what"? Of course, capitalism is morally inferior to many a philosophical utopia. And our comparative evaluation of capitalism is further skewed by the fact that when we compare capitalism to past regimes, it is often implicitly from the perspectives of those who profited most and suffered least in past systems--from the perspectives of lords rather than serfs, of masters rather than slaves, aristocrats rather than commoners. With that caveat in mind, let me turn to the first argument about the positive moral effects of the market, namely the link between individual autonomy and selfsupport through legally free labor. Adam Smith famously wrote: "It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages. Nobody but a beggar chooses to depend chiefly upon the benevolence of his fellow-citizens." This passage is most famous as a statement of the potential utility of self-interest. But notice its assertion that dependence upon the benevolence of others is morally degrading and hence something we should try to avoid if possible. Thomas Carlyle--and later Marx and Engels--would decry this system of mutual appeals to self-interest as "the cash nexus." But the flip side of the cash nexus is first of all the freedom and self-determination that comes from having cash; and second, the fact that relations based on cash do not involve the total subordination of one individual to the will of another-the characteristic forms of human relations under slavery or serfdom. Nor does it involve the subordination of the individual to the will of the state and its officials, characteristic of socialism. That is why Hegel insisted that supporting oneself by earning a living is one of the most important ways in which men get a sense of themselves as autonomous individuals. What he called "the ethic of bourgeois society," includes a commitment to "the activity of supporting oneself through reason and industriousness." All of this has dark sides, potential and real. It may lead us to a mindless commitment to work at the expense of other goods. It may lead to the belief that personal value comes only from paid labor, leading to a fear of dependence on others, or leading us to underinvest our time in vital but unpaid activity. The second argument asserts that the moral quality of self-support derives in good part from the fact that it so often extends beyond the individual, to his or her family and descendants. This argument reminds us not to confuse self-interest with selfishness, for the "interests" we pursue in the marketplace often involve more than just ourselves. As Edmund Burke put it, "The power of perpetuating our property in our families is one of the most valuable and interesting circumstances belonging to it, and that which tends the most to the perpetuation of society itself. It makes our weakness subservient to our virtue; it grafts benevolence even upon avarice."