The Nature of Guerilla Warfare

Abstract

FOREDOOMED as a result of generations of military and industrial unpreparedness, China's national armies were driven back by Japanese military superiority after a year and a half of resistance that amazed the world. That this coordinated military effort should have lasted as long as it did is a tribute to the fighting men of China. Shanghai, Nanking, Hankow, the defense of the Lunghai line and correlated conflicts, amongst which Taierchwang stands preeminent, proved to a somewhat incredulous world that soldiers, given leadership of sorts and partial training, can fight. This lesson was given once before, by the Ever Victorious Army of Frederick Townsend Ward, the American soldier of fortune, and his British successor Chinese Gordon, in the days of the Taiping Rebellion. Japan now faces the secondary stage of conquest, the pacification of occupied territory, while resistance takes the form of guerilla warfare, a more or less disorganized effort quite distinct from the grand tactics of regularly constituted national armed forces. How far China's guerilla resistance may be prolonged, what effect it will have on Japan's self-assured hegemony in the Far East, remain to be seen. China fights on today; what of tomorrow? Proponents of China repeat the words of Oom Paul Kruger, President of the Transvaal Republic, following Cronje's surrender at Paardeburg and the relief of Ladysmith: real war will begin now! Comparisons are drawn, even, by wishful thinkers, between China's present situation and that of the Thirteen Colonies during the American Revolution. The realist is limited in his conjecture to a comparative analysis of guerilla warfare in the past. Before taking up other historical examples, it may be well to point out certain essential factors in the final success of the American Revolution which are entirely lacking in China today. These factors are three: the in-