Abstract
AbstractOffers a critical assessment of Descartes's arguments for external‐world scepticism. Even granted charitable exegetical concessions, the arguments prove to be neither intuitive nor compelling. The same holds true for contemporary sceptical reasonings in the Cartesian style, including those based on epistemic ‘closure principles’ and our inability to rule out particular sceptical scenarios.
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