The Epistemic Closure Principle and the Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to examine the consequences of MacFarlane’s thesis that knowledge attributions are assessment-sensitive with reference to several central issues in contemporary epistemology. In Sect. 8.1, we first examine how Nozick’s account of knowledge as belief that tracks the truth works in his treatment of the epistemic closure principle and the sceptical argument based on it. Then we briefly examine what contextualists can say about Nozick’s treatment. In Sect. 8.2, we review the sets of facts on the basis of which MacFarlane introduced the notion of assessment sensitivity, and examine what relativists, viz. those who accept assessment sensitivity, can say about Nozick’s argument and contextualism. In Sect. 8.3, we briefly review a few other formulations of epistemic closure principles, and examine how the weaker closure principle Lawlor proposes blocks the sceptical argument without denying the intuitive claim that knowledge can be gained by deduction. In Sect. 8.4, we examine another sceptical argument,constructed by Brueckner, which does not rely on the closure principle, and consider what relativists can say about this argument. Then, in Sect. 8.5, we review the so-called problem of logical omniscience in the standard epistemic logic with reference to the versions of the closure principle we reviewed in Sect. 8.3. And finally, in Sect. 8.6, we conclude with a brief review of Holliday’s formalization of “relevant alternatives” theory and a brief discussion of interesting possibilities for making sense of assessment sensitivity by supplementing Holliday’s system with a dynamic logic of propositional commitments. Closure principle!epistemic closure principle Assessment sensitivity Knowledge knowledge ascription