The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and the Future of Warfare

Abstract

On February 24, 1991, U.S. ground troops, supported by British, French, and Arab forces, moved north from Saudi Arabia to liberate Kuwait and destroy the Iraqi military. Four days later the job was apparently done: The Kuwaiti oag once again oew over Kuwait City, and what remained of the Iraqi military was in full retreat. Astonishingly, only sixty-three Americans were killed in a ground operation that most analysts expected would cause thousands of U.S. casualties. How did the coalition’s ground forces destroy the Iraqi army so quickly and with so few coalition casualties? Does the Persian Gulf War herald a future of U.S. military dominance and low-cost U.S. military operations? What are the lessons from the aghting for U.S. foreign policy? The conventional wisdom among historians, military analysts, and foreign policy decisionmakers is that air power neutralized the Iraqi military before the ground war began. This interpretation of the Gulf War has important imTheMyth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and the Future ofWarfare Daryl G. Press