The multifaceted norm of objectivity in intelligence practices

Abstract

ABSTRACT Intelligence doctrines and textbooks on intelligence practices across a range of liberal democracies all describe objectivity as a central norm of intelligence work. However, the core meaning of objectivity is rarely fleshed out in a unified way. It seems to reflect a range of different perceptions, for example that the persons involved in the process of intelligence acquisition should be treated fairly; that intelligence professionals should minimise influence from cognitive biases; that analysts should be neutral and apolitical; or simply that subjectivity should be reduced. Since appeals to objectivity in general guide us when we are evaluating trustworthiness and legitimacy, we need to know what we mean when we talk about objectivity, as well as how we can ensure it and where we should look in order to determine to what extent intelligence practices are objective. This article maps and discusses various notions of objectivity in intelligence practices, such as interpretation-free, value-free and value-neutral. It argues that objectivity reflects at least five different norms that are irreducible to one another. By drawing on the multifaceted articulations of objectivity within the philosophy of science, a range of different meanings of objectivity is identified in the context of intelligence work. Fleshing out the complexity of intelligence objectivity reveals new subtleties that have so far not been elaborated in intelligence theory.