The Motivations of Anonymous Whistle-Blowers: The Case of Federal Employees

Abstract

The “Deep Throat” case during Watergate — in which a well-placed unidentified source called attention to governmental wrongdoing — exemplifies the complexities created by anonymous whistle-blowing. What anonymous whistle-blowers may lose in credibility they gain in protection from reprisal. The trade-offs facing the potential whistle-blower who decides to remain unidentified are examined empirically using survey data from 8500 federal employees. Propositions derived from a model of bystander intervention (Latané & Darley, 1970) are investigated, with consideration of three decision points: whether the observer of organizational wrongdoing should blow the whistle, whether the whistle-blower should act anonymously, and whether the whistle-blower should report the wrong-doing through internal channels or to someone outside the organization. The results suggest a compounding of the last two decisions: in fact, the choice of channels represents one of four distinct strategies. Whistle-blowers may be anonymous or identified with either external or internal channels, but the conditions under which they do so vary dramatically. The whistle-blower who, like “Deep Throat,” chooses to use an anonymous external channel faces a series of interrelated and complex decisions.