Abstract

In this paper I argue that even if the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) is satisfied, moral responsibility is more seriously threatened if the Principle of Alternative Possible Reasons (PAPR) is not satisfied. Nor, I argue, is it clear how it could be satisfied. Finally, I suggest that not only moral responsibility, but also normativity itself, is threatened by the failure to satisfy PAPR.

Highlights

  • Imagine that Al is libertarian free—that is, free in whatever sense libertarians demand for moral responsibility

  • Al will do X only if a reason for doing X presents itself to him just prior to the moment of choice that seems weightier to him than any reason he perceives for doing ~X. Suppose such a reason to X—call it R—will only occur to Al if he attends to, say, the evening news, which will in turn lead him to think of tomorrow’s agenda at the office, which will in turn lead him to think of R

  • That a Frankurtian counterfactual intervenor—Ivan—knows the grooves of thought in Al’s mind, wants Al to do ~X, and can intervene through a Frankfurtian device so that if Al attends to the evening news, Ivan will push a button that blocks Al’s perceiving R (Frankfurt, 1969)

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Summary

The Set Up

Imagine that Al is libertarian free—that is, free in whatever sense libertarians demand for moral responsibility. Al will do X only if a reason for doing X presents itself to him just prior to the moment of choice that seems weightier to him than any reason he perceives for doing ~X. Suppose such a reason to X—call it R—will only occur to Al if he attends to, say, the evening news, which will in turn lead him to think of tomorrow’s agenda at the office, which will in turn lead him to think of R. Ivan did not have to intervene to achieve this result (The example is in many respects similar to so-called “buffer cases”) (Hunt, 2005)

The Analysis
The Implications
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