On Young’s Version of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities

Abstract

Harry Frankfurt Journal of Philosophy, 66, 829–839, (1969) famously gave cases in which an agent lacks alternate possibilities and yet seems morally responsible. Such cases purportedly falsify the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP), which states that the ability to do otherwise is necessary for moral responsibility. There is an enormous body of literature debating whether or not Frankfurt cases and their variants do in fact falsify PAP. In order to sidestep Frankfurt cases altogether, Garry Young Philosophia, 44, 961–969, (2016) argues for a different version of PAP, namely, PAP(S), on which alternate possibilities are sufficient rather than necessary for moral responsibility. Young also argues for another sufficient but not necessary condition, the ‘Twin World Condition’ (accounting for whether the agent S would have done something other than action E if S had alternate possibilities). Only one of PAP(S) and TWC needs to be satisfied for moral responsibility. I argue here that Young’s proposal as it stands generates too much moral responsibility. So I present versions of Young’s conditions that avoid this problem. I also argue that even with those revisions, Young’s proposal does not limit moral responsibility as effectively as PAP does.