The Moral Sense

Abstract

Many important social scientific theories develop a culturalist view of norms and values. Their proponents consider values and norms as cultural features that are endorsed or rejected by social actors because they have been socialized to them. Against these influential traditions, which all dissolve the reality of moral feelings and make them the effect of highly conjectural psychological or social forces, a naturalistic reaction inspired notably by sociobiology has appeared. Its growing influence is due to the fact that its criticisms of culturalist theories are solidly grounded. However, the naturalist response is also exposed to serious criticism. An alternative solution is proposed here: moral convictions are established in the same way as cognitive convictions, i.e. that the source of moral convictions lies in strong reasons. This can be illustrated by empirical examples. The cognitivist theory of moral feelings proposed here is not contradicted by the fact that moral convictions change over time, but can explain this change more easily than other theories. Furthermore, it clarifies the question as to the nature of the moral constraints that made Durkheim uncomfortable. This theory has a special relevance in today's world where `community' seems to become the ultimate moral referent. Clearly, the positive value ascribed to the idea of community is on a par with the fact that culturalism is so popular today.