The moral economies of natural disasters insurance: solidarity or individual responsibility?

Abstract

ABSTRACT Over the second half of the twentieth century, the moral economy of insurance has shifted from solidarity and mutual support to individual responsibility. In this context, the French regime for the protection against natural catastrophes that took shape in the 1980s exemplifies a strong and almost anachronical political will to foster solidarity at the national level, thus questioning the moral economy of responsibility. This paper offers a textual analysis of the official debates that led to the launch of the regime. It shows how the representatives chose to separate compensation, financed by equal individual participation, from state prevention. This contrasts with other schemes worldwide that rely on rational decision theory to situate the responsibility for prevention at the individual level. In this alternative, risk-based premiums play a theoretically crucial role in risk signals. In practice, however, they lead to affordability issues while failing to govern prevention as theoretically expected. With the climate crisis exacerbating this phenomenon, the examination of the French regime thus allows to fruitfully revive other moral economies of insurance.