Abstract
Political business cycles reflect the imperfections of democratic institutions and are accompanied by electorally motivated interventions by governments in macroeconomic processes of redistribution of gross national product. This is fraught with potential conflict between political and economic reforms, in particular, hindering the implementation of current development programs aimed at reducing the deficit, curbing money supply growth and inflation, and liberalizing currency regimes and capital markets. This results in overestimated expectations of economic actors regarding the improvement of social welfare, loss of confidence in monetary authorities, and rising inflation. The purpose of the article is to analyze the monetary-opportunistic Nordhaus model in targeting political business cycles of inflation, as well as the impact of economic determinants of cyclicality on monetary policy.
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