Abstract

A century after the outbreak of the First World War, the authors re-evaluate the infrastructure and military logistics of the Ottoman Army in Palestine before and during the war as it affected its ability to successfully wage the military campaign in the Sinai and Palestine. Using primary sources in Ottoman Turkish, Turkish, Arabic, English, German and Hebrew, as well as official war literature, memoirs of commanders and soldiers, general military historical scholarly literature, and material specific to Palestine, coming from both adversaries, the authors show how infrastructure and logistics shaped and limited the Ottoman Army’s operational plans and their execution.

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