From Kirkilisse to the great offensive Turkish operational encirclement planning, 1912–22

Abstract

The Ottoman army after the 1 880s was modelled on the German army in its doctrine, administration, and training. It is however almost unknown in the west exactly how the German art of war was realized in the minds and plans of the Ottoman officer corps. This article seeks to provide an understanding of the importance of the German art of war in Ottoman Army offensive operations by demonstrating its attachment to the doctrine of encirclement battles of annihilation (ku~atma harekati).' Reflecting its German style of philosophy and thinking, the Ottoman Army routinely planned and attempted to execute encirclement operations during the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 and in the First World War. That the early battles were, for the most part, operationally unsuccessful does not diminish the importance of the military thought from which they originated. Later, in the War of Independence the consistent and successful application of the operational encirclement in campaign planning by the Turkish high command culminated in decisive victory. It is well known that the German army established and maintained a military mission in the Ottoman Empire from 1882 until 1918.2 Numerous distinguished and capable German General Staff officers were assigned to the mission during its tenure, including Wilhelm Leopold Colmar von der Goltz, Otto Liman von Sanders, Friedrich Kress von Kressenstein, and Hans von Seeckt. The actions of these officers (and others) are well documented by memoirs and histories as is the growth and impact of the German Military Mission itself. The Ottoman army modelled itself on the German army during this period. Of particular significance was the institutionalization of an Ottoman general staff officer corps and war academy copied directly from the Prussian model in which Ottoman general staff officers received training in the German art of war.3 The Ottoman general staff officer selection process, war academy curriculum, and its operational planning process were direct copies of the Prussian system.4