The mechanistic-holistic divide revisited: The case of the lac operon

Abstract

In this paper, I revisit the development of the repression model of genetic regulation in the lac operon to challenge a common application of a conceptual framework in the history of biology. I take Allen's (1978) account of the changes in the life sciences during the early and mid-twentieth century as an example of a common application of a framework based on the dichotomy between a mechanistic, or reductionist, approach to science and a holistic one. From this conceptual framework, Allen infers two general claims about the process of science and its goals: (1) that “mechanistic materialism” has often presented a more practical way to begin the study of complex phenomena in the life sciences, and (2) that the approach described as “holistic materialism” provides a more complete or accurate description of the natural world. The development of the lac operon model does not fit Allen's generalizations about scientific developments, and it can be used to cast some doubt on the scope of application of that conceptual framework. I argue that a better framework to interpret particular episodes in the history of molecular biology is to consider the ways in which biologists prioritize and track different aspects of the phenomena under study, rather than to focus on whether certain scientific practices are best described as developing from mechanistic to more holistic approaches. I end with some implications for the historiography of science by considering the appropriateness of different conceptual frameworks for different grains of resolution in the history of biology.