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Abstract
How do organized criminal groups (OCGs) respond to military interventions intended to weaken and subdue them? In many cases, such crackdowns have proven counterproductive as OCGs militarize, engage in violence, and confront state forces directly. Existing studies have pointed to several explanations: inter-criminal competition, unconditional militarized approaches, and existing criminal governance arrangements. Much of this work, however, has focused on national, regional, or even municipal level variation and explanations. This article takes a micro-comparative approach based on 18 months of ethnographic research in a group of Rio de Janeiro favelas (impoverished and informal neighborhoods) divided between three drug trafficking gangs and occupied by the Brazilian military from 2014 to 2015. It argues that an active territorial threat from a rival is the primary mechanism leading OCGs to respond violently to military intervention. It also demonstrates that geographic patterns of recruitment play an important role in where OCG rivalries turn violent during intervention.
Highlights
Following Latin America’s transition to electoral democracy in the 1980s, the active role of the region’s armed forces in the domestic sphere was thought to be coming to an end
Drawing on 18 months (June 2013 to November 2014) of ethnographic research in a group of Rio de Janeiro neighborhoods divided between three drug trafficking gangs and occupied by the Brazilian military, this article provides the micro-foundations of violent organized criminal groups (OCGs) responses to military intervention
While there is perhaps a role for the military to play in combating some OCGs, this study finds military interventions woefully unprepared and ill-equipped to provide longer-term solutions to the presence of OCGs in Latin America
Summary
Following Latin America’s transition to electoral democracy in the 1980s, the active role of the region’s armed forces in the domestic sphere was thought to be coming to an end. Numerous scholars have found that instead of weakening OCGs and reducing violence, military interventions encourage many OCGs to further militarize, engage in violence, and, in some cases, confront state forces directly. These behaviors remain a puzzle for social scientists because, unlike Latin America’s guerrilla and insurgent movements of the past, OCGs are not motivated by larger political transformation and have no intention of taking over or breaking away from the state (Barnes, 2017; Kalyvas, 2015; Lessing, 2015; Phillips, 2018). While there is perhaps a role for the military to play in combating some OCGs (see Pion-Berlin, 2017), this study finds military interventions woefully unprepared and ill-equipped to provide longer-term solutions to the presence of OCGs in Latin America
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