The Law: The Baker-Christopher War Powers Commission

Abstract

In an op-ed piece published in the New York Times on July 8, 2008, former secretaries of state James A. Baker III and Warren Christopher summarize the findings and recommendations of the National War Powers Commission. article begins on this note: The most agonizing decision we make as a nation is whether to go to Quite true. next sentence, however, offers a serious misconception: Our Constitution ambiguously divides war powers between the president (who is the in chief) and Congress (which has the power of the purse and the power to declare war). In a column about the commission's proposal, David Broder (2008) of the Washington Post repeats the theme about constitutional ambiguity: The Founders left a ton of confusion about a pretty important question: Who has the authority to make war? Article I of the Constitution gives Congress the exclusive right to declare war, but Article II makes the president the in chief. An editorial in Hill (2008) newspaper parroted the commission's reference to the ambiguity of war powers. These formulations--president as in and Congress as the war-declaring branch--are shallow. Referring to the title commander in chief does explain what powers go with it. powers do include starting wars. Identifying the war-declaring clause of Congress ignores seven other clauses in the U.S. Constitution that vest in the legislative branch military and national security powers (raise and support armies, make rules for the military, grant letters of marque and reprisal, call forth the militia, provide for organizing, arming, discipline the militia, etc.) For 160 years, there was no ambiguity. Until President Harry S. Truman went to war on his own in 1950 against North Korea, no one recognized a conflict or tension between the war-declaring power of Congress and the commander-in-chief responsibilities of the president. No one argued that the president could initiate war. president was in after Congress declared or authorized war. He had certain limited defensive powers (to repel sudden attacks). There was nothing ambiguous about the constitutional requirement that Congress is the branch of government authorized to decide to take the country from a state of peace to a state of war. That constitutional principle was bedrock to the framers. They broke cleanly and crisply with the British model of William Blackstone that allowed kings to control everything external to the country, including going to war (Fisher 2004, 1-8). framers created a Constitution dedicated to popular control through elected representatives. Citizens (not subjects under a monarch) empowered lawmakers to decide when to go to war. In Federalist No. 4, John Jay reviewed what executive leaders had done over the centuries in taking their countries to war. They acted for the national interest, he said, but for personal motives alone. Executives make war whenever they have a prospect of getting any thing by it; nay, absolute monarchs will often make war when their nations are to get nothing by it, but for purposes and objects merely personal, such as a thirst for military glory, revenge for personal affronts, ambition, or private compacts to aggrandize or support their particular families or partisans. Their military adventures repeatedly proved calamitous for the common people, in fortunes squandered and lives lost. Executive leaders engaged in wars not sanctified by justice or the voice and interests of [their] people (The Federalist 2002, 101). An appendix in the commission's report acknowledges that only one Framer or Ratifier at the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, Pierce Butler of South Carolina, proposed that the power to commence wars should be vested in the President alone (National War Powers Commission 2008, Appendix 4, 3). Aware of this evidence, the commission still found the picture ambiguous. …