Abstract

The ideas of the historian and philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn have had a considerable impact on discussions about political inquiry. In adopting Kuhn's ideas most political scientists have failed to question either the accuracy, nature or applicability of Kuhn's view of scientific practice. The use political scientists have made of Kuhn's central ideas, and the criticisms philosophers and historians of science have leveled against Kuhn, are examined. Kuhn's change of view about the nature of scientific practice is discussed, and an attempt is made to show why Kuhn's new view makes most works by political scientists who used his original ideas of limited, if any, value. We also examine Kuhn's position on the role of values rather than rules in assessing scientific formulations, and argue that Kuhn's position here is nothing more than speculations about the sociology of knowledge, speculations that hardly go beyond previous remarks on this topic.

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