The Khartoum Conference and Egyptian Policy after the 1967 War: A Reexamination

Abstract

The Khartoum Arab Summit of 1967 has long been known for barring any negotiations with Israel. This article re-examines Summit, based on memoirs of participants and other sources, and argues that, at least in case of Egypt, Khartoum actually marked a departure, beginning of a process which led towards a readiness employ political means, and eventually towards acceptance of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242. The differences between Egypt's approach and that of other Arab states began make itself apparent during Khartoum Summit, but, for various reasons, all parties dispute continued paint Khartoum essentially negative. The decisions of fourth Arab summit, held in Khartoum, Sudan (29 August-1 September 1967), have been identified with the three no's, (no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, and no negotiation with Israel) and conventionally seen expressing Arab's world's intransigence, despite its defeat in June 1967 war with Israel. Historiographic expressions of this argument can be found easily and in large numbers, in memoirs of those who held official positions at time, and in writings by scholars from various disciplines. Thus, for example, Henry Kissinger described decisions of Khartoum Conference a sign of Arab extremism that began after 1967 war.1 William Quandt noted that the Arab position hardened during Khartoum Conference, a result of capitulation of President of Egypt, Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir, and King Husayn of Jordan, dictates of leaders of wealthy Arab states.2 'Abd al-'Azim Ramadan, a veteran Egyptian historian, stated that Khartoum decisions had shut door on any possibility of a peaceful settlement and left only one option-war .3 The situation was described in a similar way by Adeed Dawisha, who examined Egyptian foreign policy and said that responsibility for immoderate stance of Arab position must be linked extremism demonstrated by Israel.4 Former Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir emphasized in her autobiography that decisions of Khartoum Conference were a further call to destroy Israel, even within her previous borders, and added that as far Arabs were concerned, nothing had changed..5 Moshe Dayan, Israeli Minister of Defense at time of 1967 war, came a similar conclusion, declaring that Khartoum decisions closed every opening and chance for peace.6 Official sources in Israel revealed that Israeli intelligence had obtained protocol of central, closed debate of Khartoum Conference, which made clear that participants, led by Egypt, had emphasized need restore Arabs' military strength, in order attack Israel once again. Referring information in protocol, Israel's Prime Minister, Levi Eshkol, pointed out, in a policy speech Knesset: have learned from a source on which I have no reason cast any doubt, that Egypt's President, Jamal 'Abd al Nasir, said in Khartoum Conference, which took place at end of August this year: 'We must again be able not only defend our country, but also, soon possible, prepare our army attack Israel, with assurance of victory.'7 The central thesis of this paper is that description of Khartoum Summit rejectionist is inaccurate, and contradicts positions heard in conference debates, which were also expressed in its decisions. The Khartoum Conference did not create a pan-Arab consensus that afterward supported a radical line against Israel. The decisions of conference did not intend propose an overall solution Arab-Israeli conflict, but focused on measures be adopted in an effort regain lands captured by Israel in 1967 war. In this regard there was a significant innovation: Egypt, under leadership of 'Abd al-Nasir, joined Jordan and Saudi Arabia in promoting a resolution adopt a political solution and use of diplomatic measures solve crisis. …