The Judicialization of Politics in the Philippines and Southeast Asia

Abstract

In Afro-Asia, outside India, it may be that only in the Philippines is the judicialization of politics a significant, current political development. Several factors—liberal democracy, separation of powers, a politics of rights, interest group and opposition use of the courts, and frequently ineffective majoritarian institutions with limited public respect—make substantial judicialization of contemporary Philippine politics possible or even likely. The current Constitution assigns the judiciary new and expanded powers and responsibilities, giving it great potential to judicial ize policy processes that would otherwise be the responsibility of majori tarian institutions. The constitutional grant of authority given the Supreme Court provides a foundation for it to substitute its judgment for that of any government official who has engaged in a "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction." Activist judicial attitudes have led to Supreme Court decisions that can be cited as evidence for a judicial ization of post-Marcos Philippine politics. (Decisions handed down by the Court during 1990-91 will be examined here for such evidence.) However, a developing appointment pattern that places career judges on the Supreme Court may reduce the likelihood of continuing judicialization, since, in the Philippines, such appointees have been more likely to be restraintist than have justices with different, more partisan, careers.