Citations to Interest Groups and Acceptance of Supreme Court Decisions

Abstract

Interest groups have become increasingly involved in every aspect of American politics, including at the U.S. Supreme Court, with the filing of amicus curiae briefs. In recent years, the justices have been more frequently citing interest‐group‐filed briefs in their opinions, suggesting these groups play some role in the decision‐making process. What we do not know is whether these types of citations might carry any potential implications for public perceptions of the Court's decisions as this phenomenon becomes more prevalent and people become equipped with this information. To test this empirically, I implement a survey experiment with approximately 3000 respondents that assesses acceptance of Supreme Court opinions that cite interest‐group‐filed amicus curiae briefs. I find that the public is less accepting of decisions that cite ideologically overt interests in the aggregate and less accepting of decisions that cite interest groups that are ideologically incompatible with their own preferences. However, the public does not view Supreme Court decision making as political, even when the justices cite ideologically charged groups. Taken together, these findings suggest the public uses interest group source cues to evaluate Supreme Court decisions when equipped with this information and that while the public responds negatively to politics in Supreme Court decisions, the Court maintains its image as a nonpolitical entity.