Abstract
In the realm of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs), the initial day stock price return, known as underpricing, poses a considerable financial burden on capital issuers. This study scrutinizes two hypotheses regarding IPO underpricing: the general information asymmetry theory, positing that ‘underpricing’ compensates for investor uncertainty about firm quality, and the practical underwriter-institutional investor collusion, potentially explaining the recent upswing in underpricing.Our findings indicate that the JOBS Act contributes to an increase in overall IPO underpricing post its 2012 enactment, aligning with the traditional adverse selection phenomenon. Notably, empirical analysis reveals a corresponding upsurge in underpricing tied to the increasing proportional shares of institutional investors in the post-Act period, supporting the collusion hypothesis. In summary, this paper underscores a notable side effect of the JOBS Act, revealing a pronounced increase in underpricing for issuers and subsequently enhancing the attractiveness of the underwriting business.
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