The Jeune École: The Strategy of the Weak (review)

Abstract

Reviewed by: The Jeune École: The Strategy of the Weak Chalmers Hood The Jeune École: The Strategy of the Weak. By Arne Røksund . Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2007. ISBN 978-90-04-15723-1. Appendix. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xviii, 242. $134.00. Jeune École: the only school of western naval strategy outside of the better known Mahan doctrine of world maritime supremacy. The huge fleet, the great battle, the control of the world's seas, said Mahan. But the current author, Admiral Arne Røksund, Commandant of the Norwegian National Defense College, comes from a maritime nation with no hopes of world domination and knows that the sea is not just for the [End Page 253] mightiest. So, he sought inspiration in the ideas coming out of France from the 1880s up to the appearance of the Dreadnought. Jeune École; the young school of the young turks. Jeune École; a navy built around small ships because the national coffers were empty after the Franco-Prussian War. Jeune École; a fleet of small ships perfectly suited for empire building which absorbed French maritime energies for fifty years. Sailors became explorers and trainers of colonial armies in hopes that their overseas regiments would make the difference on the Marne in the next struggle for the mastery of Europe. Jeune École; the perfect experimental doctrine in an era when ships were neither wood nor steel and were propelled neither by sail nor steam but rather were unsuccessful mixtures of all. Jeune École; the doctrine for a lesser maritime power still smarting from Trafalgar, dreaming of a comeback using small torpedo boats and fast commerce raiders. Jeune École; a doctrine which could sell as the most democratic form of national defense in an era when monarchist generals like Boulanger and anti-semitic scandals over Captain Dreyfus tarnished the image of France's armed forces. Jeune École; perfecting torpedoes on surface craft, while awaiting a functional submarine. The Jeune École was all of these things and interested parties could turn to any of the arguments to justify the investment in something other than ships of the line. This book provides the English language reader with the only up-to-date study of this curious development since the appearance of Theodore Ropp's dissertation-turned-book. Røksund has made some significant additions by using primary sources in the French Navy's archives which were closed to Ropp when he did his research in the 1930s. The result is a tight story which begins with the French Navy's surrender of her budget to finance the rebuilding of the Army after 1870 and ends with the emergence of the submarine as the first viable weapon to do what the Jeune École proposed-wage a guerre de course. In places, the footnotes are as important as the text, summarizing internal debates and secret conferences at the French Navy's war college. Admiral Røksund misses the political fight over the annual budgets for the Navy in these very lean years. As some officers admitted years later, there were politically correct speeches to make before revolving door cabinets which would guarantee a budget. Were the Jeune École enthusiasts misguided dreamers or simple pragmatists getting whatever they could? When the Dreadnought appeared and completely altered the concept of naval shipbuilding, the French admirals quickly adapted; but could they build fast enough to match their rivals? It is too bad that The Jeune École; The Strategy of the Weak is sold for a price which only research libraries and big navies can afford. One would hope that parts could be made available in more affordable form. Røksund's Jeune École is a book for the poor as well as the rich. Copyright © 2007 Society for Military History