Abstract
This article explores the institutional arrangements surrounding the Japanese prime minister and offers an analysis of the core executive style in accordance with the classifications introduced by Dunleavy and Rhodes. The constitutional arrangement was set out to establish a ‘prime ministerial government’ in Japan. However, Japanese bureaucrats, who feared strong individual authority, instead sought to create a ‘cabinet government’ which exercises strong authority as a collective body. In addition, two developments weakened the prime minister’s power over the cabinet, namely the ceremonial role of cabinet meetings and strong factionalism within the ruling party, which led to a ‘bureaucratic coordination model’. Since the 1990s, institutional reforms have shifted the Japanese core executive towards a ‘prime ministerial government’.
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