The iron law of Erdogan: the decay from intra-party democracy to personalistic rule

Abstract

Michels’ ‘iron law of oligarchy’ suggests that oligarchic party rule is inevitable, yet many parties have shown a strong commitment to intra-party democracy. However, Turkey’s akp is a typified case of Michels’ law, displaying an explicit commitment to intra-party democracy, only to later abandon it. I ask what factors have facilitated this transformation. Why does the iron law of oligarchy display itself in some parties but not in others? I argue that intra-party democracy owes its existence to three indicators – inclusiveness, decentralisation and institutionalisation. Conversely, it should be observed that a party shifting from democratic to oligarchic or personalistic intra-party rule will display decreasing levels of these three indicators in terms of policy formation and candidate selection. By tracing akp’s internal party operations since its founding in 2001, I demonstrate a gradual deterioration in these indicators, reflecting a gradual deterioration of democracy within the party to oligarchy and then to personalism.