The Interpretation of Political Theory and Practice in Ancient Athens

Abstract

The influence of social and political conditions on the content and the form of expression of literature and history, of science and philosophy, has long been the subject of speculation and of vigorously expressed but contradictory dogmas. The recognition of the natural conditions of thought, however, has in all ages tended to obscure or conceal the complementary processes by which philosophy and expression help determine or alter what pass for historical facts and social conditions. Greek political thought, in particular, has been judged and corrected, again and again, by renewed consideration of the conditions within which it developed, about which it treats, and for which it might be expected to provide insight or practical devices, yet we seldom pause to interpret what we know of social and economic situations in ancient Athens by considering the doctrines and the principles which determined the selection of facts reported in the writings that have come to us. Facts are conditioned by men's philosophies in as definite a sense as philosophies are conditioned by relevant facts. For purposes of interpretation no less than of counsel, for the scholarly labor of reconstructing the meaning of what the Greeks said, no less than for the humanistic cultivation and use of the wisdom of the past, the materials are words and facts, and it is not always easy to distinguish verbal from factual problems. Since the concern for objectivity is not calculated to facilitate the detection of this intrusion of theory, it is well to reverse occasionally the customary inquiry into the effect of political actions on subsequent philosophical theory and expression, and to examine instead the relation of philosophic speculation to the performance and interpretation of practical actions. The evolution of political theory and its relation to practice were conceived in antiquity according to two basically different philosophies which have continued in various forms to influence both our interpretation of history and our conception of the mechanisms and efficacy of political action. The one treats political and moral theory as a kind of science, distinct from art and experience, as it is likewise distinct from other sciences; and history, as influenced by and relevant to this philosophy, traces the successive applications of scientific method to moral problems. The other treats the relation of thought to action, the possible influence of reason on the passions and virtues, and the conditions under which men might be trained in