Abstract
Back in 1991, Martin van Creveld contended that non-state actors and non-interstate warfare would increasingly be prevalent in the post-Cold War world.2 These developments would pose significant challenges regarding how state militaries were to be organized and successfully utilized. Writing in 2006, van Creveld reasserts that the earlier trends have continued, if not accelerated, in the post-9/11 world. State militaries are still unprepared to the degree that “[a]s of the opening years of the twentyfirst century, the mightiest, richest, best-equipped, best-trained armed forces that have ever existed are in full decline and are, indeed, looking into an abyss”.3 Many factors speak to this seemingly dire situation. Victory, as traditionally understood, is an elusive concept in the sense that strategic success, especially through the quick application of kinetic force, is unlikely. Instead, operations, almost entirely conducted in the complex weak/failed state context, take long periods of time, require considerable patience, and involve tasks frequently not suited to the sharp application of military might.4 Indeed, the things sought after are rebuilding efforts, stabilization, and effective policing such that an acceptable “condition” is achieved.5 State militaries often buckle under the weight of these tasks, as they are often not sufficiently trained and prepared for them, nor do they often have the requisite number of personnel. Moreover, they frequently confront non-state adversaries such as terrorists, militias and rebel groups that disrespect human-rights conventions, show contempt for humanitarian obligations, or do not follow the Law of Armed Conflict. Indeed, their success, in part, rests on this disregard. “Playing” by accepted rules puts military personnel at a disadvantage and makes them vulnerable to casualties, a sensitive issue both militarily and politically in the developed world context, one that can easily sap the resolve of intervening states to seek an acceptable condition over the long haul. During the turbulent years bracketing van Creveld’s critical assessments, a new actor came to the fore alongside state militaries and other armed non-state actors: the international private security company (PSC). While PSCs predate the 1990s, it was the Cold War’s demise that triggered the release of millions of personnel from uniformed service, some ofwhom formed the initial cohort of PSC personnel. While this significant shift is now almost 20 years old, opportunities have continued to be had such that personnel are still drawn to PSCs, and the industry remains vibrant. For instance, at the time of writing, in Afghanistan and Iraq respectively there are approximately 28,000 and 50,000 armed contractors. A shift as substantial as this and on such sensitive issues, the management and control of violence, rightly attracted considerable analytic attention.6 One line of study looked at the supply factors that have advanced the industry’s development. In addition to the creation of a relevant and skilled manpower pool, the arms industry and civilian suppliers together offered private enterprise the weaponry, necessary kit and logistical support. Another line of study looked at the demand side, largely in geopolitical terms, created by the removal of what has been termed “overlay”.7 With the superpowers reducing the size of their militaries in order to capitalize on the peace dividend, and with the ideological impetus no longer existing to engage in many parts of the developing world, many conflicts were left to fester without outside intervention. Third, in terms of ideas, the privatization of security fit nicely into the larger studies about the appropriate role of the state vis-a-vis private or non-state actors.8 From the developed-world perspective, this concerned the embrace of the neoliberal economic ethos, especially in the United States and the United Kingdom. From the developing-world perspective, this related to the imposition of economic and political reforms by international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.9
Published Version
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