Abstract

The rapid spread of nuclear reactors, uranium enrichment facilities, and reprocessing plants outside of the nuclear weapons club--to countries such as Brazil, South Korea, and the Union of South Africa--has caused concern resulting in a suggestion that the technology transfer be banned until more acceptable safeguards are adopted. Several reasons why this approach to the proliferation problem is unlikely to be successful are discussed. First, the U.S. no longer possesses a monopoly over reactor technologies or fuel cycle processes. In fact, in the area of reprocessing and breeder reactor development the U.S. lags behind other industrialized countries. Second, the nature of the nuclear industries in most of these countries makes it highly unlikely that they would go along with such an embargo; rather, they would be likely to exploit the opportunity for additional nuclear sales to the fullest. Third, such a policy would run the risk of wrecking the existing NPT which guarantees countries nondiscriminatory access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. These facts have led some in the domestic nuclear power establishment to conclude that the current realities of the international nuclear energy industry not only rule out the possibility of an effective unilateral U.S. embargo policy but mandatemore » the cessation of nuclear trade. The author presents his views against this argument. He says that trade in nuclear facilities can be effectively regulated through cooperative agreements and international institutional arrangements. Recent agreements to regulate such trade, signed by six key countries, is a step in the right direction. (MCW)« less

Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call