The Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma game as a model of intergroup conflict

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Realistic conflict theory (Campbell, 1965; Coser, 1956; Sherif, 1966) maintains that intergroup conflicts are rational “in the sense that groups do have incompatible goals and are in competition for scarce resources” (Campbell, 1965, p.287). The theory is much less definitive when it comes to individual rationality. Some researchers assume that if it is rational for the group to compete, it must also be rational for the individual group members to do so. Hence, realistic conflict theory is often portrayed as “essentially an economic theory” which presumes “that people are selfish and will try to maximize their own rewards” (Taylor & Moghaddam, 1987, p.34). Other researchers (Coser, 1956; Simmel, 1955; Sherif, 1966) view individuals in intergroup conflicts asaltruists who are ready to sacrifice their self-interest for the group’s cause. This premise of (sweeping) internal solidarity as a response to outside conflict can be traced back to Sumner, who asserted that “The exigencies of war with outsiders are what make peace inside” (Sumner, 1906, p.12).