Abstract
Abstract Very often, when a person’s doxastic activity is morally wrong “think of racist beliefs, unfounded suspicions, and unfair dismissals of testimony” it also wrongs someone in particular. This suggests that we have something at stake in how others reason about us. But what, exactly? According to a natural and fairly common view, whenever you have a doxastic duty towards someone in particular, this is partly because she has a personal interest in your having (or not having) a certain belief. I will argue that this cannot be right. This result is important for several reasons, not least of which is that it helps us get a better grip on what our directed doxastic duties are and what it takes to fulfill them.
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