Abstract

This article intends to assess the impact of the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (BEPS) Multilateral Instrument (MLI) on tax treaties concluded by non-signatory jurisdictions. To achieve this goal, the authors initiated the analysis with forty-four countries that are members the BEPS Inclusive Framework but have not yet signed the MLI. Out of these forty-four countries, the authors focused on those that had tax treaties signed or amended after 2017 which has narrowed down the scope to the following countries: Angola, Botswana, Brazil, Cape Verde, Congo, Maldives, Thailand, and Vietnam. In this context, the article examines the tax treaty-related BEPS measures that were adopted by these countries in their bilateral tax treaties, addressing the merits and potential consequences of the choices made by non-signatory jurisdictions. Based on the findings of the research, the article concludes that the impact of the MLI varies significantly depending on the tax treaty policy of each country and that, thus far, it has been limited primarily to the minimum standards on dispute resolution. Multilateral instrument, non-signatory countries, tax treaty policy, minimum standard, bilateral tax treaty negotiation, BEPS implementation, hybrid mismatches, treaty abuse, permanent establishment, dispute resolution.

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