This study explores the alignment of digital services taxes (DSTs) with the non-discrimination provisions outlined in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) with particular attention being paid to the concept of ‘likeness’. It focuses on the Italian DST as a representative case and examines whether this measure differentiates between ‘like’ digital services and suppliers in accordance with Articles II (Most-Favoured Nation (MFN)) and XVII (National Treatment (NT)). The analysis employs a doctrinal approach and integrates a comprehensive examination of World Trade Organization (WTO) law with relevant case law and tax scholarship. This reveals that revenue thresholds and carve-outs introduce structural asymmetries in the competitive relationship between services and suppliers that may be regarded as ‘like’ under WTO criteria. The Italian DST is ostensibly neutral but disproportionately impacts large multinational platforms thereby posing a significant risk of de facto discrimination under current jurisprudence. This study expands on this insight and argues that a model DST law crafted in accordance with the GATS principles is essential to ensure that future digital taxation initiatives fulfil their fiscal objectives without violating multilateral trade regulations.

The number of (proposals for) EU directives in the field of direct taxation is continuously growing. In the process of drafting them, the focus appears to be on the desired outcome of that specific legislative instrument. The complete overview is not taken into account and certainly not the relation between the proposal and already existing directives or others that are pending. In this publication, the author answers the question of how directives in the field of direct taxation relate to each other, how textual differences on comparable subjects between directives and conflicts in interpretation among directive provisions can be resolved, and where discrepancies between proposals and adopted directives currently exist (and how they can be resolved). To achieve this, the hierarchy of norms in secondary EU legislation will be discussed and several suggestions for simplifications and decluttering will be made, in accordance with the EU Commission’s policy agenda.

This article provides insights into how differences in the degree of fiscal autonomy of local governments in EU Member States shape the ways in which they design and implement fiscal instruments to support the achievement of climate objectives. By comparing three countries (Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands), it demonstrates that local governments’ capacity to leverage taxation for climate purposes is essentially shaped by their national legal and fiscal frameworks. At the same time, limited fiscal autonomy does not necessarily prevent local authorities from using fiscal instruments to support the achievement of climate objectives. This is illustrated, for instance, by the introduction of the ‘pay-as-you-throw’ (PAYT) waste fee in Turin, where such a measure can be implemented despite the relatively limited fiscal autonomy within the centralized Italian system. The article further shows that local climate plans across the EU acknowledge taxation as a policy tool for advancing sustainability goals, highlighting its potential to influence areas such as mobility, buildings and energy.

Developing countries face ongoing challenges within international taxation – including influencing agenda-setting and decision-making to capacity building resources. The major issue underpinning each of these challenges is the lack of a fairer and more transparent international institution to support developing countries in international tax policymaking. The 2023 Report of the Secretary-General on the Promotion of Inclusive and Effective International Tax Cooperation at the United Nations is a ‘critical juncture’ in establishing fair and transparent international institutions. At its core, an international institution must ultimately establish ‘throughput legitimacy’ to be regarded as fairer and more transparent. The aim of this tax policy note is to guide policymakers and the policy work of the new 2025–2029 United Nations Tax Committee term as it considers new policy reforms to establish an international tax institution that is fairer and more transparent for developing countries. Part 2 summarizes the governance gaps at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and UN leading to these institutions lacking fairness and transparency. Part 3 highlights two key elements which can improve ‘throughput legitimacy’ for developing countries: (1) Regionalism and (2) Creation of a Political Tax Forum at the UN. This policy note concludes by proposing a new regionalism-based political tax forum at the UN – called the UN High-level Political Forum on International Taxation. The UN High-level Political Forum on International Taxation can be modelled similar to the UN High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development. The author is an expert participant in the policy work of the United Nations Tax Committee, and the policy recommendations in this policy note have been published on the UN Tax Committee website to provide tax policy guidance on this issue (https://financing.desa.un. org/untc-31st-session-stakeholder-input).

This paper argues that an annual wealth tax is poorly matched to the goals most often invoked by its proponents – reducing inequality, protecting democracy, and strengthening social trust. The paper develops three difficulties that make an annual wealth tax an ineffective or counterproductive instrument: a valuation problem that cannot be solved by administrative refinement; a mismatch between ambitious democratic and social ends and modest fiscal means; and incentive effects that discourage saving, investment, and entrepreneurship. As an alternative, it proposes reforms within the income-tax base that target economic rents – the excess returns that fund durable political influence and reflect unfair, policy-created scarcities. Two design changes are emphasized: treating death as a realization event to reach decades of accrued gains and adopting a minimum tax on accrued gains for the ultra-wealthy, with mark-to-market for liquid assets and deferral with interest for others. Together these reforms better align means with ends, addressing both fairness and democracy without the knowledge and incentive costs of a wealth tax.

Noting that many ultra-high net worth (UHNW) individuals pay very low effective rates of personal tax on their incomes, Zucman (2024, 2025) proposes a minimum wealth tax which ensures that UHNWs incur personal taxes of at least 2% of their worldwide wealth. This note discusses some anomalies of his hybrid income-and-wealth tax scheme, recounts some complexities in implementing and propagating it on a worldwide basis, given that individual wealth includes assets in many countries, and argues that there are other and no less appealing paths to much the same end, including taxing capital gains on accrual and enhancing inheritance taxation.