The influence of civil society activism on regional governance structures in the Russian Federation: cross- regional and policy comparisons

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Following the Beslan2 school hostage crisis in September 2004, the President of Russia Vladimir Putin proposed the creation of a Public Chamber, which was intended to function as a public oversight committee with consultation powers. This body, which was established in 2005 with 126 members, analyses draft legis lation and monitors the activities of parliament, government and other governmental bodies of Russia and its Federal Subjects. At the same time new laws on non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been adopted on the federal3 and regional level,4 in order to restructure the interaction between state and nonstate actors. According to the government, the new NGO legislation created the legal basis for NGOs as a new type of actor in the policy arena, enabling them to participate in politics.5 The Public Chamber, in addition, provides a negotiation platform that involves NGOs in problem solving and in bargaining compromises with state actors. Many observers, however, criticized the legislation as it seemed to tighten the control of the state over NGOs and to create obstacles for negotiations between the state and NGOs (Nusberger and Schmidt 2007). These controversial interpretations raise the question whether state actors really involve NGOs in problem solving and bargaining compromises and why state actors negotiate with NGOs. Analyses of authoritarian corporatism showed that economically and socially complex states cannot be governed only by technocratic-authoritarian means (Stepan 1978) and that under these conditions authoritarian regimes negotiate politics with societal actors. The literature on governance explains in detail that hierarchical steering causes information problems. This means that decision makers often do not have the required information about the object of theirdecision. Thus, the capacity of the state to effectively steer and coordinate society is seriously challenged. Negotiations between stakeholders can provide information and knowledge and can thus enhance the state capacity to solve problems (Scharpf 2000). Nowadays the combination of traditional hierarchical governance and network governance with non-state actors becomes ever more necessary in order to provide state functions, because in modern societies the need for sophisticated information and knowledge is growing constantly (Mayntz 1993). According to Linz, relations between state and non-state actors in authoritarian states differ, however, from those in democratic ones in that they are limited pluralistic (Linz 2000). Thus, the existence and the leeway of political and societal actors in authoritarian states depend on the authoritarian regime. The state dictates the institutions and procedures for negotiations with non-state actors. This forced institutionalized model of solving conflicts allows for the representation of societal interests while at the same time limiting conflicts. Although the theory of authoritarian corporatism seems to be of great use in understanding why and how state actors involve non-state actors in negotiations in Russian politics, we propose that it does not sufficiently correspond to and explain reality. We claim that NGOs in Russia are nowadays sufficiently powerful to influence whether and how state actors involve them in negotiations. In order to address the question why and how state actors in Russia involve non-state actors in negotiated governance, we analyse and compare interactions between state and non-state actors in five regions and three policy fields. The chosen cases differ in two ways. First, the interest of state actors to cooperate with NGOs differs depending on the policy field. Second, each policy field is analysed in two regions with different resource distributions among involved actors. The cases are ethnic policy in the Krasnodar and Stavropol regions, social policy in the Perm and Nižnij Novgorod regions and environmental policy in the Krasnodar and Irkutsk regions. The cases were chosen in a way that allows for testing whether the theory of authoritarian corporatism sufficiently explains why and how state actors negotiate with NGOs or whether the resources of NGOs to force the state to involve them in negotiations is a necessary additional contributing cause. The non-state actors we consider are private business actors and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The term ‘non-governmental organization’ describes organizations, linked to civil society. The crucial characteristic is that they are independent of the government, which means autonomous from the state and not oriented to profit-making. They can be differentiated from citizen initiatives and social movements, which often follow close or similar interests by their concrete organizational structure (Nohlen 2002: 324ff.). In our analyses we include NGOs that have an independent articulation of interests, possess differentiated financing, are not profit oriented and have concrete organizational structures. The following section of the chapter will first introduce the issues at stake in the various cases as well as the interests and resources of the main actors. In thesecond section the interactions between state and non-state actors will be analysed. The chapter concludes with a summary of the findings.