Abstract
There is dispute among philosophers as to whether immortality is compatible with a physicalist account of personal identity. Even for theists, there are problems that face the physicalist proponent of immortality. If we suppose that God reassembles particles to make up a specific individual (what has been termed the ‘naïve reassembly model’; Mooney, 2018, p. 274), it seems to open the possibility that God could make two such reassemblies, calling into question which is the ‘real’ person. It is certainly challenging to think about what might happen in the event of a duplication of this sort. But if reassembly is possible, or perhaps even inevitable, the fact that it challenges our concepts of personal identity, or even the idea of physicalism itself, is something that simply has to be grappled with. That is, those who dismiss the ‘naïve reassembly’ model are starting from the assumption that God cannot do anything that would clash with our concepts of identity.
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