The inevitability of animal biotechnology? Ethics and the scientific attitude

Abstract

Most observers of biotechnology are aware that the main standard critiques of animal biotechnology are based on either animal rights/ welfare arguments, ecological-oriented arguments, or socioeconomic consequences arguments. In this chapter, I want to suggest that despite the logic or seeming appropriateness of many of these critiques, they lack ethical force. By this I mean that the arguments (and the arguers) are unlikely to actually change the minds of those engaged in biotechnology practices and policy-making (Stevenson, 1944; Olshevsky, 1983). This is because of the orientation or attitude of those entrusted with doing and overseeing biotechnological work with non-human animal species. I will argue that this orientation must change before ethical arguments concerning animal biotechnology, indeed ethics generally (in the philosophical sense as opposed to legalistic or professional courtesy senses), mean anything to the scientific community. Public policy may be one tool to change this orientation but, given the social power of science, the tack more likely to be successful is the moral re-education of scientists and science-policy makers. There is some evidence that sympathy toward ethical concerns is beginning to make its way into the mind-sets of some people in the bioscience establishment. However, given the ease of replies to the standard types of criticisms of animal biotechnology, which I will (partially) catalogue below, there are considerable obstacles to ‘ethics in science’ in these cases.