A Theory of Justice for Animals

Abstract

This book argues that animals are worthy recipients of justice, and that, in practice, excluding animals from a theory of justice amounts, at best, to the claim that we have very limited direct duties to some animals, and, at worst, that we only have indirect duties to them. At the level of ideal theory, or the goal to which we ought to be aiming, it is argued that a valid theory of justice for animals should be rights-based, and alternative approaches based on contractarianism, animal welfare, utilitarian or capabilities ought to be rejected. Further, an abolitionist (or species-egalitarian) theory of animal rights is rejected in favour of an interest-based theory of animal rights - described as the enhanced sentience position - which recognises that animals have a right not to suffer but suggests that humans have a greater interest in life and liberty than most species of nonhuman animals. Despite not necessarily ruling out the use of animals, it is argued that the enhanced sentience position is still very demanding on us, and is far removed from current practices. At the nonideal level, the book recommends a version of animal rights – described as the sentience position - as the most appropriate nonideal theory of justice for animals. Whilst only requiring that we show that animals have a right not to suffer at the hands of humans, it is sufficiently aspirational, whilst at the same time remaining morally permissible and politically possible.