The ineffability of qualia and the word-anchoring problem

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The ineffability of qualia and the word-anchoring problem are intimately related. Innate neural structures realize qualitative experiences that we rapidly learn to associate to their aboutness and to other events. Phylogenetically conserved neural structures provide the common endowment that serves as the bases for phenomenal knowledge and for building a virtual language-independent phenomenal-intentional lexicon, in which the ‘entries’ are the what-it-is-like of experiences and their ‘definitions’ consist in their aboutness and in their indexical reference. Qualitative experiences consist in analogue neurophysiological processes, which are ineffable simply because they cannot be duplicated in other brains through propositions or symbolic descriptions. A second virtual dictionary, the verbal-phenomenal lexicon functions as a ‘bilingual’ dictionary that interconnects signals, utterances and words developed by a specific culture with our common phylogenetic endowment. This grounds words in the phenomenal, establishing a bridge between language and intentionality. The third lexicon— a personal version of the regular dictionary—explains the meaning of words with definitions, but eventually, it must resort to examples to refer to the meaning of ineffable words anchored in the verbal-phenomenal lexicon. The references to qualitative experiences entered in the regular dictionary are unintelligible to individuals who do not share our genetic endowment and phenomenology, as illustrated by color blindness. The limited hardware of the brain determines the scope and the nature of our experiences. Fortunately, we can transcend the limitations of phenomenal knowledge through propositional knowledge, which incorporates the combinatorial symbolism of language and the normative influence of science and philosophy.