Abstract
An argument of Donald Davidson's (1970, 1973) has convinced many people that there is something suspect about the commonsense, belief-desire-action explanations that most of us apply to human behavior. Alexander Rosenberg (1980, 1983) has been convinced by Davidson's argument, and uses its conclusion (together with some ideas about sociobiology) to explain what he regards as the persistent failures of the social sciences. In this paper I shall not comment directly upon Davidson's argument. Instead, I will discuss an unacceptable implication of Rosenberg's use of it. Whether this reflects on Davidson's argument I leave for others to decide.This is how Rosenberg uses the conclusion of Davidson's argument to explain the (alleged) failures of economics.Philosophers have shown that the terms in which ordinary thought and the behavioral sciences describe the cause and effects of human action do not describe “natural kinds,” : they do not divide nature at the joints.
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