The Incoherence of Walzer’s Just War Theory

Abstract

Michael Walzer closes his seminal book, Just and Unjust Wars,1 on a curious note. He admits that his theory of just war produces inconsistent moral prescriptions. In certain situations, to be explored below, Walzer says his theory both permits and prohibits same course of action. In these situations, he says, our judgments are doubled, reflecting dualist character of theory of war ... we say yes and no, right and wrong.2 Walzer tells us that this reveals the ultimate incoherence of theory of war,3 and that the world of war is not a fully comprehensible, let alone a morally satisfactory place.4 In course of developing his theory of just war, Walzer hints that this practical contradiction has its origins in a contradiction at theo retical level, in particular, in a between his theories of jus ad hel ium, justice of war, and jus in bello, justice in war. For instance, at moment Walzer introduces jus ad bellum/jus in bello distinction, he warns that two categories may not cohere. As he says, The dualism of jus ad bellum and jus in bello is at heart of all that is most prob lematic in moral reality of war.5 He tells us that is a tension between ends and means, jus ad bellum and jus in bello.6 And he cau tions, I am not sure whether moral reality of war is wholly coherent. Walzer closes Part 2 of book, which articulates substance of his theory of jus ad bellum, which he calls theory of aggression, by saying, again, that are tensions between it and theory of jus in bello. Though theory of aggression is itself coherent, he claims that it is not consistent with jus in bello. Here, he says, there appear to be tensions and even contradictions that are internal to argument for justice.7 Though Walzer suggests that theory's practical contradictions are a product of a contradiction between his theory of jus ad bellum and his